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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v . •. : 
COREY EDWARD HARVELL, : Case No. 20070967-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an Order of restitution entered on November 1, 2007 resulting 
from a conviction of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003), and Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), in the Third Judicial 
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith Atherton, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (effective February 7, 2008) (previously codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2002)). See Addendum A (Order for Restitution). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution for brake replacement 
and damaged property inside of a stolen vehicle when defendant only pleaded guilty to 
attempted theft by receiving stolen property rather than stealing the vehicle. 
Standard of Review: "'[Appellate courts] will not disturb a trial court's order of • 
restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its 
discretion.' Furthermore, c[w]hether a restitution [award] is proper . . . depends solely 
upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness.'" State v. Miller, 
2007 UTApp 332,^)6, 170 P.3d 1141 (internal citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the restitution hearing held October 12, 
2007. R. 87. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutory provisions determinative of the issue on appeal 
are located in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed an Information on March 6, 2007, charging Mr. Harvell with one 
count of Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(2003); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003); and Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404. R. 1-3. Mr. Harvell entered a guilty plea to Attempted Burglary, 
a third degree felony and Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree 
felony. R. 23-36, 37-38; 96. 
. - 2 ' 
Mr. Harvell was sentenced on September 7, 2007 in four separate cases. In the 
cases applicable to this appeal, Mr. Harvell was sentenced to serve two concurrent 
indeterminate terms of zero to five years in the Utah State prison for his convictions of 
attempted burglary and attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R. 69-69A; 92:7. 
The sentence was ordered to be served consecutively with the other cases. Mr. Harvell 
objected to the proposed restitution amount and requested a restitution hearing. R. 92:8 
A restitution hearing was held on October 12, 2007, where Mr. Harvell argued that 
he was not legally responsible to pay restitution for brake replacements or property 
missing from the stolen vehicle where he had not been convicted of, nor admitted 
responsibility for stealing the vehicle. R. 70, 87:3-7. The trial court ordered restitution 
in the amount of $763.24. The amount represents restitution for brake repair, $539.24, a 
tank of gas, $25, and replacement of aNano IPOD, $199. R. 71-72; 87:16. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Cami Losee left her vehicle parked at the home of her friend's, Hector Carrillo, on 
February 7, 2007 while she was vacationing in Italy. R. 87:9; Losee Ltr. Ms. Losee's 
vehicle was reported stolen from this location on February 12, 2007. R. 87:9; Losee Ltr. 
On February 13, 2007, officers responded to a report of a residential burglary at 
the home of Gary Rigby. R. 66:5; PSR 5. Mr. Rigby reported that when he returned 
home, he noticed a vehicle in his driveway. PSR 5. As he approached his home, Mr. 
Harvell came out claiming to be a friend of Mr. Rigby's son, Joshua. PSR 5. Noticing 
1
 The facts are taken from the presentence report (PSR), Ms. Losee's restitution request 
and other evidence presented at the restitution hearing. R. 66; 87; Victim information 
file: Letter from Cami Losee (Losee Ltr). 
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his home's side window opened, Mr. Rigby went inside and found his home "ransacked." 
PSR 5-6. Mr. Rigby found many of his belongings missing from his home. PSR 6. Mr. 
Rigby was able to provide officers with the license and description of the vehicle Mr. 
Harvell was driving. PSR 5. 
At an apartment complex, a man found a box of checks with Mr. Rigby's 
telephone number on them and called him. PSR 6. Officers went to the apartment 
complex to recover the box of checks. PSR 6. Officers found the vehicle matching the 
description given by Mr. Rigby in a parking stall at the apartment complex. PSR 6. 
Discovering the vehicle had been reported stolen February 12, 2007, officers went to the 
apartment with the corresponding number on the parking stall where the vehicle was 
parked. R. 87:9; PSR 6. Mr. Harvell was located within the apartment and taken into 
custody. PSR 6. 
During questioning, Mr. Harvell admitted to being at Mr. Rigby's residence but 
denied entering the home. PSR 6. Mr. Harvell also "initially denied driving the stolen 
vehicle, but eventually claimed it was Moaned' to him." PSR 6. Officers determined the 
vehicle driven by Mr. Harvell had been taken during a residential burglary and belonged 
to Cami Losee.2 PSR 6. 
2
 Mr. Harvell entered a guilty plea to attempted burglary of Mr. Rigby's home and 
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, both third degree felonies. R. 23-36; 37-38, 
96. The trial court sentenced Mr. Harvell on both counts to an indeterminate term of zero 
to five years at the Utah State prison, to run concurrently with each other but 
consecutively to the other cases. R. 92:7. 
4 
Ms. Losee was in New York when her vehicle was recovered so she had Mr. 
Carillo and "another friend Zach Jensen . . . pick up [her] car for [her]." Losee Ltr. It 
took Ms. Losee a week to return to Salt Lake City from New York. Losee Ltr. When 
Ms. Losee inspected her vehicle upon her return she "noticed the alignment was off, [her] 
IPOD was broken and [her] IPOD FM transmitter was missing, [her] cd collection was 
noticeably smaller, [her] coat was gone, and the gas tank was empty." Losee Ltr. After 
about a week, Ms. Losee "noticed a screeching noise by [her] front passenger side tire 
every time [she] pushed on [her] brakes." Losee Ltr.;87:10. Ms. Losee was unable to 
afford to have her brakes repaired at this time. Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10. She waited to have 
her brakes repaired until April by which time "the problem with [her] brakes made it 
almost impossible to drive." Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10. 
When she took her vehicle in for repair in April, the mechanic told Ms. Losee that 
her "brakes, caliper, and rotor on [her] front passenger side" had to be replaced. Losee 
Ltr. In addition, she was informed that repairs to the driver's side of the vehicle were 
also necessary because "they couldn't repair one side without repairing the other." Losee 
Ltr. The state submitted a restitution request to the court on Ms. Losee's behalf for 
$993.03 for the brake repairs and for damage or lost property inside her car. R. 92:8; 
87:3; Victim Information file. Mr. Harvell objected to the restitution requested by Ms. 
Losee and a restitution hearing was held. R. 87; 92:8. 
During the restitution hearing, defense counsel argued that "Mr. Harvell is not 
legally bound to pay restitution" because he was not charged with stealing Ms. Losee's 
vehicle but pleaded guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R. 87:3-4. 
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Specifically, defense counsel argued that brakes "are a normal wear and tear issues on a 
car" and there was no evidence that Mr. Harvell had caused the brakes to wear out during 
his possession of the vehicle. R. 87:5, 13. In addition, defense counsel argued that the 
restitution requested for the items damaged or missing from inside the vehicle were 
inappropriate because the only property Mr. Harvell pled guilty to receiving was the 
vehicle. R. 87:5, 13. The state argued that the restitution was proper because Mr. 
Harvell "had control of the vehicle from the night it was stolen to the point it was 
recovered." R. 87:10. The state asserted the vehicle was reported stolen on February 12, 
2007 and recovered February 13, 2007. R. 87:9. 
The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $763.24. The amount 
represents restitution for brake repair, $539.24, a tank of gas, $25, and replacement of a 
NanoIPOD, $199. R. 71-72; 87:16. Mr. Harvell filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 75-
76. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it ordered Mr. Harvell to pay restitution for brake 
repairs and replacement of a broken IPOD where Mr. Harvell was not convicted of and 
did not admit responsibility for stealing the vehicle. Utah law clearly establishes that a 
defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for criminal activities for which he did not 
admit responsibility, was not convicted, or agreed to pay restitution. No evidence was 
presented to establish a sufficient nexus between Mr. Harvell's admitted conduct of 
possessing the vehicle and the damage found. Based on the evidence, it cannot be 
established that the extent of damage can be attributed to Mr. HarvelPs short possession 
6 
of the vehicle rather than the continued driving of the vehicle by Ms. Losee until the 
vehicle was "almost impossible to drive." Because Mr. Harvell did not admit 
responsibility for stealing the vehicle, the order to pay restitution for the brake repair and 
broken IPOD violates due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. BECAUSE MR. HARVELL DID NOT ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR STEALING THE VEHICLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ORDERING RESTITUTION FOR BRAKE REPLACEMENT AND 
DAMAGED PROPERTY INSIDE THE VEHICLE. 
The trial court erred in ordering Mr. Harvell to pay restitution for brake repairs 
and replacement of a broken IPOD Nano where he was not convicted of and did not 
admit responsibility for stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. R. 87:16; 96. Mr. Harvell pled 
guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property in relation to Mr. Losee's stolen 
vehicle. R. 23-36, 37-38; 96. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) states: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, 
or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
Id. Under Utah law, an individual is guilty of an attempt "if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
4-101(1) (2003). In accordance with these statutes, Mr. Harvell admitted responsibility 
only to attempting to "receive[ ] . . . property of another knowing that it has been stolen." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). Therefore, Mr. Harvell could only be ordered to pay for 
restitution resulting from his admitted responsibility. 
Utah's restitution statute states in part: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
the plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (2003). The statute defines "'[criminal activities,'" as 
"any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which 
the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(b) (2003). 
"Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(c) (2003). 
This court has reaffirmed recently that "'a defendant cannot be ordered to pay 
restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, 
was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.'" State v. Hight, 2008 UT App 
118, p (quoting State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1|9, 60 P.3d 582). This is because 
"the restitution statue 'requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly 
established, much like a guilty plea before the court can order restitution.'" Hight, 2008 
8 
UT App at 1|3 (quoting State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1(5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per 
curiam)). 
In State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 P.3d 1143, this Court ruled that the 
defendant could only be ordered to pay restitution resulting from her admitted conduct 
"enumerated in her plea" which was receiving stolen property rather than paying "for all 
items stolen in the burglary." Id. at ^[18-19. In Mast, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
receiving stolen property for the possession of property she was found with which had 
been stolen as a result of a home burglary. IcL at ^[1. Although Mast had not been 
convicted of burglary nor admitted responsibility for any of the other items stolen during 
the burglary, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution for the total value of property 
taken excluding those items recovered. Id. at ^5. This Court determined that the trial 
court erred in the restitution order because the defendant "entered a guilty plea only to the 
receiving stolen property charge, she cannot be held to answer for all damages resulting 
from the burglary." Id. at 1fl8; see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) 
(finding restitution order erroneous for conduct defendant was not convicted of nor 
admitted responsibility). This Court vacated the restitution order and remanded the case 
for a hearing, "to determine what pecuniary damages resulted from defendant's admitted 
conduct". Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at 1|19. 
In contrast, in flight, this Court determined that where a defendant has pled guilty 
to a broad offense like burglary, it is unnecessary that "his responsibility for any 
particular missing item[] 'be firmly established . . . before the court can order restitution 
[for them]." Hight, 2008 UT App 118 at |^4 (citation omitted). Right had argued that 
9 
although he admitted to committing a burglary, the trial court had erred in ordering him 
to pay restitution for items he never admitted to stealing. Id. This court disagreed stating 
that "[o]nce Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad 
discretion, after reviewing the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, in ordering 
restitution for any pecuniary damages clearly resulting from the burglary." Id. at *|j5 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, Mr. Harvell was never charged nor admitted responsibility for the 
broader offense of actually stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. The factual basis on the plea 
form given to support the guilty plea was that Mr. Harvell "drove a stolen vehicle [and] 
went to a stranger's house [and] stole a carton of cigarettes." R. 25; 96:7. At the plea 
hearing, the factual basis he admitted to was that he "retained or disposed of a motor 
vehicle . . ., knowing that the vehicle had been stolen."*" R. 96:8. The presentence report 
notes that Mr. Harvell only admitted to the vehicle being "'loaned' to him." PSR 6. The 
record supports that Mr. Harvell admitted to no more than attempted theft by receiving 
the stolen vehicle, and did not admit to stealing the car or items in it. 
For Mr. Harvell to be held responsible for damage to the brakes of the vehicle or 
the broken IPOD inside the vehicle, a "sufficient nexus" must exist between these -
damages and Mr. Harvell's admitted criminal conduct. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT 
App 273, YII 3-5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam) (determining that a "sufficient nexus" must 
exist between a defendant's admitted criminal conduct and damages suffered by the 
J
 The factual basis supporting his guilty plea in this case was not discussed during the 
sentencing hearing. R. 92. 
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victim before restitution can be ordered). Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the 
defendant's admitted conduct and the pecuniary damages suffered by the victim requires 
the trial court to determine that "liability is clear as a matter of law and [that] commission 
of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages." State v. Robinson, 
860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
For example, in Watson, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of 
justice after allegedly driving two other suspects to and from a crime scene. Watson, 
1999 UT App 273 at <p. Watson also admitted to selling the car used in the crime. Id. 
The sentencing court ordered Watson to pay restitution to the Victim's Reparation Fund 
for money it gave to the victim's family for counseling. Id. In issuing this order, the 
sentencing court stated: 
[T]he defendant did admit to the responsibility of driving this vehicle. And 
in this court's opinion also, [defense counsel], in spite of the fact that you 
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am just of the opinion that 
there are sufficient facts, substantial as they may be, which are reflective of 
the defendant's state of mind in this particular case; i.e., hearing the shots, 
individuals running toward the vehicle, her admission that she drove the 
vehicle away. In this court's opinion [that] is sufficient nexus to hold her 
accountable for restitution. .. . 
Id. at <|}4. This Court reversed, clarifying that "the statute is more narrow." Id. at 
1J5. Specifically, the statute "does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's 
state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing 
court." IdL Because Watson admitted only to the obstruction of justice charge, and 
there was no "firmly established admission of responsibility upon which to order 
Watson to pay restitution," a sufficient nexus did not exist. Id. at ^5. 
11 
Similarly, in State v. Woods, 953 P.2d 834 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), the 
Washington Court of Appeals determined that the restitution order requiring defendant to 
pay for personal property taken from a truck when it was stolen was improper because 
there was no causal relationship between the defendant's admitted offense and the 
victim's damages, h i at 836-38. Woods had pled guilty to possessing stolen property, a 
motor vehicle, on September 4, 1995. Id. at 835. However, at the restitution hearing a 
letter allegedly written by Woods indicated that she had stolen the vehicle on August 17. 
Id. The trial court ordered Woods to pay restitution for personal property taken out of the 
vehicle when it was stolen in August. Id. 
The court determined that even if it could be assumed "that Woods did steal the 
vehicle in August, she cannot be required to pay restitution for other uncharged offenses 
because she did not expressly agree . . . to pay restitution for crimes for which she was 
not convicted." Id. The court's reasoning was based on the lack of a causal relationship 
between Woods's admitted conduct and damage suffered by the victim. Id. at 837. 
Employing a "but for" factual test to evaluate a causal link, the court stated "it cannot be 
said that "but for" Woods's possession of the stolen vehicle in September, the owner 
would not have lost the personal property located in the vehicle when it was stolen in 
August."4 Id. In addition, "a reasonable person could [not] foresee the loss of personal 
4
 This Court's utilization of a "modified but for" test in the context of a restitution hearing 
has generally been limited to circumstances where crimes of negligence are at issue 
because of the difficulty of determining whether damages resulted from the act of 
negligence. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (applying a 
"modified 'but for' test" to determine whether the intervening negligence of the police 
broke the chain of causation relieving defendant of liability for restitution). However, 
12 
property located in a vehicle when it is stolen as a consequence of mere possession of the 
stolen vehicle." Id.; see also State v. Tetters, 914 P.2d 784, 785 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) 
(concluding defendant's "mere possession of the vehicle is neither sufficiently, nor 
necessarily, related to the lost personal property [from inside the vehicle]. [Defendant] 
cannot be obligated to pay restitution for those items."); State v. Sellers, 709 P.2d 768, 
770 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (determining defendant can only "be sentenced to restitution for 
pecuniary damages to the vehicle that resulted from" the time he actually admitted to 
possessing the vehicle). 
In this case, there was no evidence that showed a "sufficient nexus" between the 
defendant's conduct resulting from the short amount of time he admitted to possessing 
the vehicle and the brake repairs required on Ms. Losee's vehicle. Nor was any evidence 
presented to show that Mr. Harvell's actual time possessing the vehicle bore any 
relationship to the damaged property located inside the vehicle. The facts presented at 
the restitution hearing were that Ms. Losee left her vehicle parked at the home of her 
friend Hector Carrillo on February 7, 2007, while she vacationed in Italy. R. 87:4, 9; 
Losee ltr. Mr. Carrillo reported the vehicle stolen on February 12, 2007. R. 87:4, 9. Mr. 
Harvell weis taken into custody and questioned about Ms. Losee's stolen vehicle after he 
was linked to the vehicle following a burglary committed on February 13, 2007. R. 87:9; 
where the crime is one of criminal intent rather than negligence, the modified "but for" 
test is not useful because pecuniary damages are easier to trace, or not to trace, to the 
crime. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^5 ("Without making inferences as the trial 
court did, it cannot be said that Watson admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she 
agree to pay restitution. Watson only admitted and pleaded guilty to the obstruction of 
justice charge for which there were no pecuniary damages. Thus there was no firmly 
established admission of responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay restitution."). 
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PSR 6. During questioning, Mr. Harvell "initially denied driving the stolen vehicle, but 
eventually claimed it was Moaned' to him." R. PSR 6. 
Because Ms. Losee was in New York when her vehicle was recovered, her car was 
picked up by her friends Hector Carillo and Zach Jensen. Losee Ltr. Ms. Losee was not 
able to inspect her car until a week later when she returned to Salt Lake City from New 
York. Losee Ltr. Upon inspecting her vehicle, Ms. Losee "noticed the alignment was 
off [her] IPOD was broken and [her] IPOD FM transmitter was missing, [her] cd 
collection was noticeably smaller, [her] coat was gone, and the gas tank was empty." 
Losee Ltr. It took another week before Ms. Losee notices a "screeching noise by [her] 
front passenger side tire every time [she] pushed on [her] brakes." Losee Ltr.;87:10. 
However, Ms. Losee claims she was unable to afford to have her brakes repaired at this 
time so she waited until April when "the problem with [her] brakes made it almost 
impossible to drive." Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10. It was when she finally took her vehicle in 
for repair in April, that the mechanic told Ms. Losee that her "brakes, caliper, and rotor 
on [her] front passenger side" had to be replaced. Losee Ltr. In addition, repairs to the 
driver's side of the vehicle were also necessary because "they couldn't repair one side 
without repairing the other." Losee Ltr. 
Defense counsel argued that "brakes . . .are a normal wear and tear kind of issue 
on a car." R. 87:5. It is something that happens as a vehicle is being driven over a period 
of time. There is no evidence to indicate that driving a car for at most what equated to a 
24- hour span of time can cause the brakes to wear out needing repairs of this type. Ms. 
Losee's friends took possession of her vehicle after it was recovered and a week passed 
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before Ms. Losee could inspect her vehicle. When she does inspect her vehicle she does 
not notice anything that would indicate that her brakes had been damaged. It wasn't until 
another week passes before she claims that she starts hearing a "screeching noise." 
Furthermore, based on Ms. Losee's own statements, it is not possible to establish that the 
extent of brake repair required can be attributed to Mr. liarvell's short possession of the 
vehicle rather than Ms. Losee's continued driving of the vehicle until "it [was] almost 
impossible to drive." Losee Ltr. 
In addition, a "sufficient nexus" has not been established between the broken 
IPOD located inside the vehicle and Mr. HarvelPs admitted conduct of attempted 
possession of the vehicle. Again, Mr. Harvell was not convicted of nor admitted 
responsibility for stealing the vehicle. "The only item of stolen property [he was] 
charged with receiving [was] in fact the car." R. 87:5. "[A] reasonable person could 
[not] foresee the [damage to] personal property located in a vehicle when it is stolen as a 
consequence of mere possession of the stolen vehicle." Woods, 953 P.2d at 837; see also 
Tetters, 914 P.2d at 785 (concluding defendant's "mere possession of the vehicle is 
neither sufficiently, nor necessarily, related to the lost personal property [from inside the 
vehicle]. [Defendant] cannot be obligated to pay restitution for those items."). Therefore, 
a sufficient nexus cannot be established between the defendant's admitted conduct of 
attempted theft by receiving a stolen vehicle and the damages suffered by the victim. 
Finally, the sentencing court's order of restitution violates procedural due process 
because due process requires more than an inference of responsibility. The Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated that federal and state due process entitles a defendant "to 
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due process protections during sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." State v. 
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994). In fact, "procedural fairness is equally 
mandated at the sentencing phase as at the guilt phase of a trial." State v. San wick, 713 
P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Mr. Harvell has made no admission of 
responsibility for stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. A formal admission of responsibility is 
required under principles of due process because '"[fjor the purposes of determining the 
basis for restitution, the admission of a defendant is essentially the same as a plea of 
guilty . . . . Because such an admission can result in liability for substantial sums of 
money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be firmly 
established." Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 at |^5 (citation omitted). Because Mr. Harvell 
did not admit responsibility for stealing the vehicle, the order to pay restitution for the 
brake repair and broken IPOD violates procedural due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Harvell respectfully requests that the ordering imposing restitution for the 
brake repair and broken IPOD be reversed. 
SUBMITTED this \g day of September, 2008. 
^ — 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Deputy Ctork 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE Of UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
-vs-' 
COREY EDWARD HARVELL 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
Case No.071901648 
Judge Judith S. Atherton 
Based on the State's Motion, and good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant COREY EDWARD 
HARVELL, is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $763.24 to Cami Losee for car 
repairs, to include brake repair, gasoline, and a broken IPOD NANO. In addition, the 
defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,450.00 to Gary Rigby for 
property that was not recovered, including jewelry, a flat screen television set and video 
games. The total amount of restitution for both victims in the above entitled case is 
$3,213.24. ^ 
DATED this I _day of OCPOBER, 2007, 
BY THE COURT 
L_JM> 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2003) 
76-4-102 Attempt—Classification of offenses. 
Criminal attempt to commit: 
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony; 
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony, except that an attempt to commit any of 
the following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not fewer than three years and which may be for life: 
(a) murder, a violation of Subsection 76-5-203 (2)(a), if the victim or another suffers 
serious bodily injury in the course of the actor's commission of the offense; 
(b) child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(c) any of the felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, that are 
first degree felonies; 
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; 
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; and 
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the penalty for 
a class C misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-4-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-102; 1983, ch. 88, § 10; 1996, 
ch. 40, §3; 2002, ch. 57, § 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
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Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003) 
76-3-201 Definitions —Sentences or combination of sentences allowed -- Civil 
penalties—Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to 
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
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(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f)to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement, 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order 
the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the 
defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state 
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
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(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear 
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single 
trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to 
any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for 
costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order 
the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of 
incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs 
established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
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(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated 
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation 
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered 
restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided 
under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76- 1-304, the 
county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of 
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of 
the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or 
mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement 
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional 
facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the 
opposing party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation 
officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, 
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the 
defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for 
imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines 
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing 
Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a 
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant 
causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the 
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information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge 
at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state 
This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 
1; 1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 
13, § 19; 1995, ch. 111, § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 
1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 
1998, ch. 149, § 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 4; 2003, ch. 
280, § 1 . 
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